It is without question that " '[d] etermination of the proper coverage of an insurance contract when the facts are not in dispute is a question of law'", i.e., a legal determination. Tennant v. Smallwood, 211 W.Va. 703, 568 S.E.2d 10, 13 (2002) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for a party seeking coverage in a declaratory judgment action to identify an "expert witness" to testify as to the construction and application of insurance policy provisions. Fortunately, West Virginia law provides that such testimony is inadmissible. Indeed, "[e]ach courtroom comes equipped with a 'legal expert,' called a judge . . . . " Burkhart v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 112 F.3d 1207 , 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1997 (citing Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 509-10 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861, 98 S.Ct. 188, 54 L.Ed.2d 134 (1977) ).
The standards for the admissibility of expert testimony are found within the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The evidence at trial included testimony of plaintiff's expert, who opined USAA should have provided a defense because he 'believed' the McNairs' complaint alleged facts which would constitute an 'occurrence' or 'accident' within the meaning of the policy, and also would constitute 'property damage' and 'bodily injury' within the meaning of the policy. USAA objected to this testimony, claiming it was an opinion which interpreted the terms of a written instrument -purely a legal conclusion. We agree. The interpretation of the scope of a policy is a question of law. . ., as is whether an insured could reasonably expect a defense under the policy. . . . Experts may not opine on pure questions of law.
Id. at 269, n.5 (citations omitted).
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that a trial court abused its discretion in allowing an expert witness to testify as to an insurer's duties under a policy. In Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11 th Cir. 1990), the Court stated "Donaldson testified that in his opinion Aetna had a duty to hire tax counsel in this case. . . . This was a legal conclusion, and therefore should not have been admitted. The district court abused its discretion by allowing Donaldson to testify about the scope of Aetna's duty under the policy." [Citation and footnote omitted].
The Montgomery and Devin analysis is routinely applied. The Northern District of Alabama rendered a similar decision in Carrier Express, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co. In Carrier, suit was filed alleging a bad faith refusal to settle claims against an insured. 860 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ala. 1994 . The district court excluded the defense expert, a decision which was subsequently challenged. Id. at 1476. The Carrier Court stated "Professor Hamilton's expected testimony was a dissertation of the law as it related to this case. All topics addressed therein were pure questions of law. As such, this testimony was properly excluded. Decisions regarding questions of applicable law are the province of the court. The court instructs the jury regarding the applicable law; the witnesses do not." Id.
Likewise Cir. 1999 ) ("Although experts may disagree in their conclusions, their testimony cannot be used to provide legal meaning or interpret the policies as written.") (citations omitted).
Thus, the proper application of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence should preclude expert witnesses from opining on the proper construction and application of insurance policy provisions. Stated otherwise, the evidentiary rules should leave only one "cook" to tend the "broth", the judge.
